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INTRODUCTION

The Restatement (Third)of Torts' is expected to continue the consumer-oriented trend that began with the recognition of strict products liability under section 402A.2 Prior to the adoption of the
Restatement (Second) in 1965,3 the law required an injured plaintiff
either to focus on the defendant's failure to conform to the standard of
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law; B.A., University of Texas;
J.D., St. Mary's University School of law; M.C.L., Southern Methodist University;
L.L.M., University of Michigan; Fulbright Scholar; American Law Institute. The
Author would like to thank his research assistant, Jeremy C. Martin, for his tireless efforts in editing and superb work in writing the footnotes.
1. See RESTATEMENT (THuD) OF ToRTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY § 8 (1997).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (allowing a plaintiff to recover by showing that a product was defective and unreasonably dangerous when
it left the manufacturer); RESTATEMENT (THuR) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LiABLITY
§ 2(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) (providing that "a product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though
all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product");
Matthew R. Johnson, Note, Rolling the "Barrel"a Little Further: Allowing Res
Ipsa Loquitor to Assist in ProvingStrict Liability in Tort ManufacturingDefects,
38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1197, 1237-38 (1997) (recognizing that proposed revisions to the Restatement (Second) of Torts result in a producer or distributor of a
product being held liable for defects regardless of the degree of care used).
3. See Kevin M. Warsh, Corporate Spinoffs and Mass Tort Liability, 1995 COLUm.
Bus. L. REv. 675, 688 (referring to the 1965 adoption of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts as "giving rise to a 'second wave' of lawsuits in the 1980s).
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care as required by the law of negligence 4 or to comply with the Uni5
form Commercial Code's complicated law of warranty.
In establishing a cause of action under the negligence standard,
the doctrine of privity presented early problems.6 Another obstacle to
a plaintiffs recovery was establishing a defendant's responsibility for
the alleged defect.7 Additional concerns involved measures that
would have detected the problem prior to placing a product into the
stream of commerce. 8
Similarly, the law of warranty did not facilitate a plaintiffs burden. 9 While both express and implied warranties were created at the
time of sale, 10 a plaintiffs recovery could be limited, and in some cases
denied completely.1 1 These hurdles, combined with the costly expense
4. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Tribute in Memory of Herbert Wechsler, 100 COLUAI.
L. REv. 1362, 1364 (2000) (imparting that the Restatement (Second) clarified the
concept of negligence).
5. See Charles E. Cantu, Twenty-Five Years of Strict Products Liability Law: The
Transformation and Present Meaning of Section 402A, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 327,
328 (1993) (explaining that under section 402A courts were no longer required to
focus on the actions of the defendant or the principles of the law of warranty);
Robert A. Van Kirk, Note, The Evolution of Useful Life Statutes in the Products
Liability Reform Effort, 1989 Duima L.J. 1689, 1693 (observing that "courts began
to stretch warranty and negligence principles" in order to protect injured individuals); see also William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (StrictLiability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960) (discussing the elements of negligence); Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 364-65 (1965) (suggesting that breach of
warranty principles are less than ideally suited to products liability actions).
6. See Van Kirk, supra note 5, at 1693 (observing that the privity doctrine allowed
only the original purchaser to recover).
7. See id. (imparting that plaintiffs had similar difficulty proving that appropriate
safety measures would have uncovered the problem prior to sale); see also Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 76-77 (N.J. 1960) (explaining
that the importance of strict liability is that the plaintiff does not need to show
the defendant's responsibility).
8. See Warren E. Platt, Post Sale Duty to Warn, 379 PRAc. L. INST. 265, 279 (1989)
(recognizing that a defective product may appear safe when sold); Van Kirk,
supranote 5, at 1693 (reviewing the limitations of an injured plaintiffs recourse).
9. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (stating
that plaintiff must prove violation of an express warranty by demonstrating he
"read and relied on the representations . . . in the manufacturer's brochure");
William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 801 (1966)
(discussing a manufacturer's opportunity to show that the plaintiffdid not rely on
the representations); Van Kirk, supra note 5, at 1693 (explaining that manufacturers could defeat a warranty cause of action by demonstrating that the plaintiff
had not relied on the representations concerning the product's quality).
10. See David S. Morritt & Sonia L. Bjorkquist, ProductLiability in Canada:Principles and PracticeNorth of the Border, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 177, 182 (2000)
(referring to legislative establishment of "implied conditions and warranties independent of any express contractual warranties").
11. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 1239 (discussing the theory that strict liability is an
outgrowth of the implied warranty of merchantability); Van Kirk, supranote 5, at
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of litigation,' 2 often resulted in situations wherein an injured plaintiff
was left with little or no recourse. 1 3
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts brought these
inequities to an end.1 4 The law of strict products liability as set forth
by the American Law Institute produced a simple and straightforward
approach that eliminated obstacles and eradicated many of the legal
fictions previously invoked.i 5 For the first time, an injured consumer
could prevail simply by establishing that the product in question was
defective.16
Once enacted, section 402A quickly became an integral part of
American Jurisprudence.' 7 It is credited with increasing the number
of lawsuits in the area of consumer protection,iS and many maintain
that now the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme.' 9 Manufacturers are now held responsible not only for defective products
causing injury, as contemplated by the Restatement,20 but also goods
that would not ordinarily be perceived as "products."2 ' Some main-

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

1694 (describing the courts' application of warranties that ran with the goods to
tort law as forced); see also U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978) (requiring a good to be "fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used").
See John Hill, Introduction, Consumer ProtectionSymposium, 8 ST. MARY's L.J.
609, 609 (1977) (observing that, prior to the adoption of section 402, "losses were
simply too small to justify the costs of litigation").
See id. at 610 (referring to the common law remedies as "ineffective").
See Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1330 (Conn. 1997) (citing
Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189 (Conn. 1965), as one of the first cases to adopt
the rule provided for in section 402A).
See Platt, supranote 8, at 307-08 (suggesting that a post-sale duty to warn might
arise under strict liability); Van Kirk, supranote 5, at 1694-97 (1989) (describing
the wide acceptance of section 402A).
See Van Kirk, supra note 5, at 169 (opining that strict liability is an avenue
through which the trier of fact can infer negligence on the part of the manufacturer); see also Montez v. Ford Motor Co., 161 Cal. Rptr. 578, 580 (Ct. App. 1980)
(referring to a showing of a defect as a shortcut to a showing of negligence); cf.
Terry Morehead Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980s: "Repose Is Not the
Destiny" of Manufacturers,61 N.C. L. REv. 33, 42 (1982) (presuming the defendant's responsibility in order to protect innocent injured plaintiffs).
See Potter,694 A.2d at 1329 (noting that "courts have widely accepted the concept
of strict tort liability").
See Cantu, supra note 5, at 328 (stating that "[slection 402[A] marked the beginning of a growing revolution in the field of plaintiff-oriented litigation").
See Terry Morehead Dworkin, FederalReform of Product Liability Law, 57 TUL.
L. REv. 602, 604 (1983) (stating that two-thirds of the states have adopted some
measure of tort reform); Van Kirk, supra note 5, at 1701 (explaining that product
liability awards increased from 143,000 in the 1960s to nearly 377,000 in the
years between 1975-1979).
See Potter,694 A.2d at 1329 (observing that "[s]ection 402A imposes liability only
for those defective products that are 'unreasonably dangerous'").
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIAaILITY (1998); David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definitionof "Product"Under the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability, 55 Bus. LAw. 799, 801 (2000); Marshall S. Shapo, In

Searchof the Law ofProductsLiability: The ALI Restatement Project,48 VAND.L.
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tain that products liability should now extend to injuries inflicted dur22
ing the dismantling, destruction, and general recycling of products.
One might even argue that in thirty years the legal system has gone
3
from strict products liability to unlimited liability.2
This phenomenon has resulted in cries of insurance crises as well
as the need for tort reform. 24 The outburst has been so strident that,
after almost four decades of developing products liability law, perhaps
we should take a new look at these issues. The purpose of this article
is to consider an idea that has previously received little attention: the
premise that a manufacturer should not be held responsible for injuries once the useful life of its product has come to an end. We should
explore the prospect that, like all things tangible, products eventually
grow old and die,25 and that once this process has taken place, a manufacturer should not be held responsible for resulting injuries.
II.

BACKGROUND

From its inception, strict products liability law has looked to the
manufacturer when allocating the cost of fault.2 6 When so-called
space age technology was first recognized as a boon to mankind and
by-products of each new wave of advancement made life in the home
and workplace easier, healthier, and more convenient, the law im-

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

REV. 631, 642 (1995) (describing products liability as a "vigorously evolving
branch of the law").
See, e.g., Charles E. Cantu, The Recycling, Dismantling,and Destructionof Goods
as a ForeseeableUse Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 46
ALA. L. REV. 81, 97-98 (1994) (opining that every product must be recycled, dismantled, or destroyed at the end of its useful life); Michael B. Gerrard, Fearand
Loathing in the Siting of Hazardousand Radioactive Waste Facilities:A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TuL. L. REV. 1047, 1175 (1994)
(explaining that recycling actually results in the production of new goods).
See Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More
ProtectiveThan the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L.
REV. 985, 1019 (1998) (discussing the change that may come as a result of the
adoption of the third Restatement).
See Keith Moheban, Comment, Hodder v. Goodyear: End of the Road for the Useful Life Defense?, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1081, 1087 (1989) (restating the argument
that the "avalanche" of products liability claims made a manufacturer's potential
liability uncertain); Van Kirk, supra note 5, at 1689-90 (observing the claim of
insurance companies that the rise in products liability actions resulted in premium increases).
See Cantu, supra note 22, at 98-99 (noting that "a manufacturer will not be held
liable for injuries caused by a product which should no longer be in use and in
fact should have been discarded").
See Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionalityof Product
Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 599-600 (1981) (arguing that
in a free enterprise system manufacturers are best able to bear the burden); Van
Kirk, surpa note 5, at 1699-1700 (acknowledging that manufacturers often have
the ability to forecast potential liability and can price their products accordingly).
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posed any resulting risk upon the manufacturer. 27 While these developments benefited society as a whole, those who introduced new
products into the stream of commerce were responsible for the corresponding increase in the number of injuries and fatalities occurring on
28
a daily basis.
This allocation of risk was by no means unanimous. 2 9 One conflicting idea was that the injured plaintiff should bear part of the burden,
and that safety, like charity, should begin in the home. 30 This approach reflected the prevalent belief that a family was responsible for
the safety of its individual members, and that one had a duty to make
one's abode and workplace safer.3i However, a manufacturer's options in selecting what should have been the best materials, safest designs, and the most efficient means of assembly were presented in
opposition to imposing responsibility upon an injured plaintiff.32 Additional persuasive factors included a manufacturer's ability to issue
27. See Dana K. Astrachan, Note, Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.: Asbestos Manufacturers and Strict Liability: Just How Strict Is It?, 23 PAC. L.J.
1807, 1814 (1992) (imparting the purpose of admitting state-of-the-art evidence is
to introduce evidence of the unknowability of a product's risks); Moheban, supra
note 24, at 1083.
28. See C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93, 97 (1983)
(suggesting that "[b]ecause manufacturers cannot predict the standards by which
their products will be judged, they may be reluctant to introduce new designs or
innovative products"); Marcus L. Plant, StrictLiability ofManufacturersfor Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 950
(1957) (implying that the adoption of strict liability might result in impeding the
development of new products).
29. See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse:How Trial Judges
are Using Their Evidentiary ScreeningRole to Remake Tort CausationRules, 49
DEPAuL L. REV. 335, 335-36 (1999) (referring to judgments in products liability
cases as "normative"); Page Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations
About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1329, 1333 (1966) (noting that "[tihe
assumption is that the manufacturer can shift the loss to the consumers by
charging higher prices for the products").
30. See Mary J. Davis, Individual and InstitutionalResponsibility:A Vision for Comparative Faultin ProductsLiability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 285-86 (1994) (distinguishing a manufacturer's responsibility for the product from responsibility for
the injuring incident); James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping With the Time Dimension
in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 931-39 (1981) (outlining the policy
reasons behind the imposition of strict products liability).
31. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 348 (Tex. 1998)
(Hecht, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD): PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 2
cmt. a (1998), that "requiring individual users and consumers to bear appropriate
responsibility for proper product use prevents careless users and consumers from
being subsidized by more careful users and consumers"); Jonathan Bridges, Note,
Suing for Peanuts, 75 NOTRE DAtE L. REV. 1269, 1289 (2000) (acknowledging
that individuals with allergies must accept responsibility for their own safety because they are "in the best position to reduce the risk of exposure").
32. See John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute
Adorns a "New Cloth"for Section 402A ProductsLiabilityDesign Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 493, 724 (1996)
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adequate warnings and instructions, 33 secure insurance against
loss, 3 4 and ultimately pass the cost of liability to all consumers. 3 5
36
While others in the stream of distribution were ultimately liable,
there was never any question that they could seek indemnification
from the entity upon which responsibility should be placed-the
manufacturer.37
III.

DEFENSES IN GENERAL

Even in this climate of manufacturer liability there were defenses. 38 From the beginning, manufacturers could claim contribut-

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

(imputing the knowledge of the risk to the manufacturer); see also Prentis v. Yale
Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185 (Mich. 1984).
See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 815-18 (Tex. App. 1978), rev'd,
584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) (balancing various factors, including the manifacturer's ability to eliminate the defect and the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions); see also Dean Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of
"Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559,
565 (1969) (indicating that misinformation about "the dangers involved in the use
of the product" should form a basis for recovery); John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability ofManufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965) (listing the "effect of instructions
or warnings" as one of the factors of consideration).
See David W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of "Product"Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 845, 872 (2000)
(observing that "[sitrict liability therefore prevents the unsuspecting consumer
from bearing the costs of injury"); Gary T. Walker, The Expanding Applicability
of Strict Liability Principles:How Is a "Product"Defined?, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 1,
3 (1986).
See Lisa L. Locke, ProductsLiability and Home-Exercise Equipment: A Failureto
Warn and Instruct May be Hazardousto Your Health,22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 779,
781 (1988) (opining that "[u]ntil manufacturers design and market safe, effective
products, with adequate warnings and instructions, consumers injured by homeexercise equipment will look increasingly to the failure to warn action in seeking
recovery from manufacturers"); cf. Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., Am. Home
Prods., 594 F.2d 1051, 1054 (5th Cir. 1979) (listing characteristics of adequate
warnings); Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1976)
(enumerating the factors for the adequacy of warnings).
See Amy Edwards, Mail-Order Gun Kits and Fingerprint-ResistantPistols: Why
Washington Courts Should Impose a Duty on Gun Manufacturersto Market Firearms Responsibly, 75 WASH. L. REV. 941, 954 (2000) (imparting cases wherein
plaintiffs have claimed that manufacturers should be liable for distribution practices); Dragan M. Cetkovic, Loss Shifting: Upstream Common Law Indemnity in
ProductsLiability, 61 DEF. CouNs. J. 75, 75-76 (1994) (discussing apportionment
of liability in terms of a distributional chain).
Thomas A. Matthews, Products Liability in Alaska-A Practitioner'sOverview,
10 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 29 (explaining that a retailer can obtain indemnity from a
manufacturer if it did not contribute to the defect); see also Fairbanks N. Star
Borough v. Kandik Constr., Inc., 823 P.2d 632, 638 (Alaska 1991) (holding the
indemnitor jointly liable with the indemnitee only if the indemnitee was not
jointly at fault).
See, e.g., Tonya Smits Rodriguez, Comment, Extending the Fraudon the Market
Theory: The Second Circuit's Connection Test for SEC Rule 1OB-5, 25 J. CORP. L.
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ing fault on the part of the plaintiff in the forms of contributory
negligence or assumed risk,39 misuse or abuse of the product, 40 or that
the injured party had in some way encountered an obvious risk.41
Based upon principles of equity and sound public policy, the plaintiffs
conduct was always a factor to consider in determining whether and
how much he should recover. 42 The idea of a defense with respect to
4 3
the mere passage of time, however, was not always so apparent.
The issue in cases dealing with the deterioration of products is of
dual proportions. The first part inquires as to whether the product
has endured the rigors of normal wear and tear.44 If a product has
endured normal use, its manufacturer is absolved of responsibility.4 5
423, 439 (2000) (providing three defenses for a drug manufacturer); William

Tetley, Q.C., A CanadianLooks atAmerican Conflict of Law Theory and Practice,

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

Especially in the Light of the American Legal and Social Systems (Corrective vs.
DistributiveJustice), 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 354 (explaining how the
state of Virginia applied negligence defenses in products liability cases).
See William J. McNichols, The Relevance of the Plaintiffs Misconduct in Strict
Tort Products Liability, the Advent of Comparative Responsibility, and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 201, 207 (1994) (explaining
the relationship between plaintiffs conduct issues and an issue on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof).
See Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1366-67 (Okla. 1974) (referring to the affirmative defense of misuse or abnormal use in adopting Oklahoma's
strict tort products liability doctrine of manufacturers' products liability); McNichols, supra note 39, at 207 (explaining the relationship between plaintiffs
conduct issues and an issue on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof).
See John Michael Robinson, Jr., Self-Service Slip and Falls: Is the Storekeeper's
Burden Too Great?, 48 LA. L. REV. 1443, 1463 (1988) (explaining that the application of the doctrine of assumption of risk serves as a complete bar to plaintiffs
recovery); see also Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1135-36 (La.
1988) (suggesting that a defendant's duty might not extend to open and obvious
risks).
See W. PAGE KEETON E' AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 17, at 478 (5th ed.
1984); HENRY WOODS, COitPnAATIvE FAULT § 7.1, at 363-74 (2d ed. 1987); Gail D.
Hollister, Using ComparativeFault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed
in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiffand Defendant are at Fault, 46
VAND L. REv. 121, 128 (1993) (concluding that most courts consider comparative
fault in strict liability cases).
See Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing Two Assumptions About
Federalismand Tort Reform, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 371, 381 (1996) (imparting that
several states have enacted statutes under which the passage of time affects
products liability substantively as opposed to procedurally); James A. Henderson,
Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of Corporate
Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765 (1983).
See LEWIs BASS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4.03, at 52 (1986); Douglas R. Richmond,
Expanding ProductsLiability: Manufacturers'Post-Sale Duties to Warn, Retrofit
and Recall, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 7, 16 (1999) (distinguishing between a defect caused
by a manufacturing problem and a defect resulting from normal wear and tear).
See Gary C. Robb, PracticalApproach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict
ProductsLiability Cases, 77 N.W. U. L. REv. 1, 20 (1982) (stating that if the manufacturer knows of no risks associated with the normal use of the product, the
product is not defective). Some courts have refused to formulate a test for "defec-
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The second part explores the possibility that the manufacturer has
introduced a product into the stream of commerce that is so fragile
that he should have foreseen a risk of injury. 4 6 In these cases, courts
have readily imposed liability based on the concept of a defective
product.47
A third result has evolved in scenarios involving the disposal and
destruction of a product once its useful life has come to an end. 48 In
these cases, the courts have universally held, despite vigorous and logical arguments to the contrary, that when a product is dismantled or
recycled, it is not being used in the manner intended.4 9 This unintended use is therefore unforeseeable, and any resulting injury is not
50
the responsibility of the manufacturer.
51
The concept of "state of the art," however, is still evolving. This
has real significance because of the difficulty in holding a manufac-

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

tive condition," allowing a plaintiff to recover for an injury suffered in the course
of the normal use of a product. See Matthews v. Stewart Warner Corp., 314
N.E.2d 683, 691-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
See JoHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 17.04, at 330 (1996); Robert C. DeDona, Simply "Too Tenuous" McCoy v. American Susuki Motor Corporation: The Application of the Rescue Doctrine to a Products Liability Claim, 20
PACE L. REv. 497, 510-11 (2000) (suggesting that the "purpose of imposing strict
liability upon a manufacturer arises from [his] ability to foresee injuries and to
protect against them").
See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (extending the strict liability doctrine to a variety of products); David S. Goldberg,
Manufacturers'Post-Sale Duties in Texas-Do They or Should They Exist?, 17 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 965, 969 (1986) (explaining that the basis for liability is that the
manufacturer did not further inspect the product for defects).
See Ronald L. Green, Torts, 86 Ky. L.J. 907, 924-25 (1998) (imparting the facts of
a case wherein plaintiffs were injured when transformers which had exceeded
their useful lives were salvaged); cf Janice M. Hogan & Thomas E. Colonna,
Ph.D., Products Liability Implications of Reprocessing and Reuse of Single-Use
MedicalDevices, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 385, 385 (1998) (discussing products liability exposure resulting from inappropriate or inadequate reprocessing
techniques).
See Cantu, supra note 22, at 85 (providing that individuals involved in dismantling or recycling products are not "users" under the Restatement's definition);
see, e.g., Boscarino v. Convenience Marine Prods., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 116, 117
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (agreeing that dismantling a product is not an intended use
which gives rise to a strict liability claim); High v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 559
So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding as a matter of law that salvaging junk components of a product was not foreseeable product use).
See M. Stuart Madden, Modern Post-Sale Warnings and Related Obligations, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 33, 52-53 (2000) (imparting the New York Court of Appeals rule that "a manufacturer has 'a duty to warn of the danger of unintended
uses of a product provided these uses are reasonably foreseeable'"); Edward
Steinbrecher, When PlayingGoes Wrong, 36 TRL 76, 78 (2000) (explaining that
liability may be imposed if the unintended use is foreseeable).
See Robb, supra note 45, at 2 (explaining that some jurisdictions have created a
statutory "state of the art" defense); see generally Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 135
N.E.2d 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956).
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turer to a standard that is unknown or in some cases impossible to
53
meet. 5 2 Still, some courts have imposed liability in this situation,
reasoning that strict products liability is not concerned with what the
manufacturer knew or ought to have known, but with the condition of
the product. 5 4 This dichotomy is further blurred by jurisdictional
views which provide that state of the art is not a defensive issue, but a
burden that a plaintiff must meet in order to establish that the manufacturer had feasible alternatives or reasonable expectations concerning defects. 5 5
Intergenerational harms, on the other hand, present an interesting
and totally unrelated problem. 56 There is no question that the medical arena has made tremendous technological advances. 57 Today a
medical expert can convince a jury that certain substances are toxic,
52. See Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive
Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 848 (1983) (opining that statutes invoking the useful
life approach "seem incoherent both theoretically and operationally"); see also
Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn. 1988) (referring to the limits of liability for aging products as "perplexing").
53. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 882-83 (Alaska 1979) (articulating that "unreasonably dangerous" narrows the scope of recovery and unduly
increases the plaintiffs burden); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olsen Corp., 501 P.2d 1153,
1162 (Cal. 1972) (opining that "a requirement that a plaintiff also prove that the
defect made the product 'unreasonably dangerous' places upon him a significantly increased burden and represents a step backward").
54. See Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin, 942 S.W.2d 712, 717-18 (Tex. App.
1997) (allowing consolidation in the face of a state of the art defense); John C.
Peck & Wyatt A. Hock, Engineer'sLiability: State of the Art Considerationsin
Defining Standard of Care, 23 TRIAL 47 (Feb. 1987). But see Vassallo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 924 (Mass. 1998) (assessing duty to warn in
terms of foreseeable risks known or knowable in light of the state of the art).
55. See, e.g., Bloyed v. Gen. Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422, 429 (Tex. App. 1994),
affd, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996) (holding that because the alternative designs
had not been tested, there was no indication that a design change would not do
more harm than good); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Boyett, 674 S.W.2d 782, 790
(Tex. App. 1984) (opining that the existence of safer alternatives is relevant in
illustrating the available scientific knowledge and practicalities).
56. See Paul A. Le Bel & Richard C. Ausness, Toward Justice in Tobacco Policymaking: A Critiqueof Hanson and Logue and an Alternative Approach to the Costs of
Cigarettes, 33 GA. L. REv. 693, 694 (1999) (opining that suggestions for dealing
with the risks associated with tobacco must be sensitive to inconsistent demands); Jack W. Snyder, Silicone Breast Implants: Can Emerging Medical, Legal, and Scientific Concepts be Reconciled?, 18 LEGAL MED. 133, 187-93 (1997)
(including intergenerational injuries in the list of the causes of action available to
plaintiffs in silicone breast implant litigation).
57. See James P. Daniel, Of Mice and 'Manimal': The Patent & Trademark Office's
Latest StanceAgainst Patent Protectionfor Human-BasedInventions, 7 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 99, 99 (1999) (imparting the challenge technological advances pose to
judges and legislators); Amy Shelf,A Need to Know Basis: Record Keeping, InformationAccess, and the Uniform Status of Children ofAssisted ConceptionAct, 51
HASTINGs L.J. 1047, 1047 (2000) (noting the precision with which doctors are able
to manipulate human fertility).
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carcinogenic, and in some cases produce chromosomal changes that
are manifested in generations not yet born.58 When members of unborn generations come into existence bearing the effects of these
harmful pharmaceuticals, the issue becomes whether to impose liabil59
ity upon the manufacturer.
Again, the jurisdictions are divided.60 Some hold, as in situations
involving proximate cause, that public policy limits the extent of a
manufacturer's responsibility. 6 ' Some courts hold that liability
should be extended only to those who ingested or were exposed to the
harmful substance in utero,62 while others, at the opposite extreme,
impose liability more readily. 6 3 The reasoning of the latter is that
strict products liability litigation focuses on the condition of the product, and if it is defective liability will necessarily follow.64
58. See, e.g., Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982) (recognizing a child's causes of action based on injuries sustained in utero); Curlender
v. Bio-Science Labs., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811 (1980) (deciding a case in which an
infant born with Tay-Sachs disease sued a medical testing laboratory for incorrectly conducting genetic tests on parents when testing error led to conclusion of
no danger of transmitting the disease to the infant); see also Frank Gulino, Comment, Legal Duty to the UnbornPlaintiff.Is There a Limit?, 6 FORDAM URB. L.J.
217, 230-31 (1978) (discussing the impact of medical knowledge upon the law).
59. See Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a
drug manufacturer, "like any other manufacturer, can be held liable for a defective product under the theory of strict products liability"); Daniel E. Troy, In Defense of Retroactive Laws, 78 TEX. L. REv. 235, 252 (1999) (discussing liability of
DES manufacturers).
60. Compare Lindsay, 637 F.2d at 90 (holding that a drug manufacturer, "like any
other manufacturer, can be held liable for a defective product under the theory of

61.

62.

63.

64.

strict products liability"), with ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-701 (West 1992) (insulating drug manufacturers from liability for punitive damages if the drug was
approved by and labeled in accordance with the FDA requirements).
See Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (curtailing
employers' ability to protect employees' unborn children); Carole Stern &
Cathleen M. Gillen Tienery, Inheriting Workplace Risks: The Effect of Workers'
Compensation "'ExclusiveRemedy" Clauses on the PreconceptionTort After Johnson Controls, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 800, 801 (1993) (addressing the issue of preconception toxic torts).
See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 199 (N.Y. 1991), (finding that "in
these circumstances no cause of action accrues in favor of the infant plaintiff
against the drug manufacturers").
Compare Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (permitting the parents
of a child, born alive, to maintain an action for injuries sustained in utero), and
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715 (Tex. 1997) (allowing
the issue of whether an unborn child suffered an injury as a result of exposure to
a dangerous substance up to the jury as finder of fact), with Wolfe v. Isbell, 280
So. 2d 758, 763 (Ala. 1973), and Simon v. Mullin, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1977).
See W. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, § 55, at 370-71 (5th ed.
1984); Margaret M. Hershiser, Preconception Tort Liability-The Duty to Third
Generations: Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 24 CREIGHTON. L. REV. 1479, 1490-91
(1991) (imparting the difficulties with recognizing an unborn fetus's cause of ac-
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Finally, statutory repose should be mentioned. Similar to the idea
of a statute of limitations, this defense limits the time within which an
injured plaintiff may bring his or her cause of action. 6 5 However, they
differ on one important point: a statute of limitations runs from the
time of injury, or in some cases when the injured party discovers or
should have discovered the harm, 6 6 while a statute of repose begins to
run when the product is manufactured or introduced into the stream
of commerce. 6 7 The theory behind each is to ensure timely litigation.68 More importantly, both of these defenses limit the time period
during which manufacturers should be held accountable for the condition of their products. 69 In this respect, each is the perfect defense; if
the time period has elapsed, regardless of the presence of a defect,
there is no liability.
IV.

USEFUL LIFE DEFENSE

The useful life defense is an idea closely related to the statutes of
limitations and repose,7O as well as the defense of deterioration. 71

65.
66.
67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

tion); Ozer M.N. Teitelbaum, PregnantWomen in the Computer Era: Are Video
Display Terminals the Next Mass Exposure Products Liability Scenario?, 5
SoFTWARwL.J. 493, 506 (1992) (suggesting that a products liability action might
be available for injuries to an unborn fetus).
See McGovern, supra note 26, at 584-87 (describing several definitions of "statute
of repose"); Moheban, supra note 24, at 1088 (explaining that these statutes reflect the principle that a claim involving an older product has less merit).
See Departments, What's New?, 12 S.C. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 42, 57 (reviewing the facts of a case wherein the statute of limitations was tolled by the discovery rule).
See Moheban, supra note 24, at 1090 (describing this time as the duration in
which the product is safely available for use); see, e.g., MiNN. STAT. § 604.03
(1988) (defining useful life as the period during which with reasonable safety the
product should be useful to the user).
See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS LLABILrTY AND SAFETY 406 (2d ed. 1989);
Tami J. Johnson, Note, Limiting Manufacturers'Liability for Aging Products, 39
DRtAKE L. REv. 713, 720 (1990) (expressing that "[1]egislatures initially enacted
statutes of limitation to remedy the common law's open-ended liability potential
for manufacturers").
See Frank E. Kulbaski III, Statutes of Repose and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn:
Time for a New Interpretation,32 CONN. L. REv. 1027, 1032 (2000) (noting that
the period of time allowed under statutes of repose tends to be longer than that
for statutes of limitations).
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (2000) (stating that "[tlen years after a product is first sold for use or consumption, it shall be rebuttably presumed that the
product was not defective and that the manufacturer or seller thereof was not
negligent and that all warnings and instructions were proper and adequate").
See Van Kirk, supra note 5, at 1718 (considering whether a defect or natural
deterioration caused the injury); Paul J. Wilkinson, Comment, An Ind. Run
Around the U.C.C.: The Use (Or Abuse?) of Indemnity, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1407,
1413 (1993) (suggesting that "if the condition at time of sale is such that the
product is subject to deterioration, change, or use making the product dangerous,
liability may be found on that basis").
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The premise supporting this concept is that each product has a definite life span, and that once this span has lapsed, the manufacturer
should not be held responsible for injuries resulting from the use of
these products. 72 To paraphrase Dean Prosser, we must accept the
idea that all products eventually grow old and die. 73 All tangible
goods enjoy respective periods of time during which they are best
suited to serve their respective purposes. 74 If we continue indefinitely
to hold a manufacturer liable for injuries arising from the use of a
product, we are unreasonably extending the precepts that originally
75
supported section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
To date, no jurisdiction has adopted the useful life defense as part
of its common law. Instead, the few jurisdictions that have incorporated the defense have done so legislatively by enacting provisions
that limit a manufacturer's liability based on time. 76 However, unlike
statutes of repose or limitations, these laws do not operate as affirmative defenses.77 Instead, the useful life of a product is considered as
one factor in determining the contributory fault of a user or consumer.7 8 In such a case, the jury is instructed to consider the fault of
a plaintiff in exposing himself to a foreseeable risk by using a product

72. See Glass v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 618 F. Supp. 314, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Kuisis
v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 319 A.2d 914, 922 (Pa. 1974); Mickle v. Blackmon, 166 S.E.2d 173, 189 (S.C. 1969); see also Johnson, supra note 68, at 717-19
(tracing the development of the policy reasons behind the concept of a product's
useful life).
73. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 102, at
711-12 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1998).
74. See George N. Meros, Jr. & Chanta G. Hundley, Florida'sTort Reform Act: Keeping Faithwith the Promise of Hoffman v. Jones, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 461, 47071 (2000) (noting that manufacturers have been subjected to perpetual liability
despite the fact that "[niothing is made to last forever").
75. See id.; see also Richard C. Ausness, Replacing Strict Liability with a ContractBased Products Liability Regime, 71 TEmP. L. REV. 171, 174 (1998) (proposing
that the UCC might be preferable to the tort-based system of products liability).
76. See, e.g., MODEL UNIF. PRODS. LIAB. ACT § 110 (1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-577a (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1994); MINN. STAT. § 604.03
(2000); see also Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 830-32
(Minn. 1988) (concluding that the statute is ambiguous regarding its function as
a defense); Johnson, supra note 68, at 720-21 (1989) (describing the impact of the
discovery rule).
77. See Julie A. Schultz, Note, DisregardingPrecedent in Minnesota Choice of Law:
Nesladek v. Ford Motor Co., 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1237, 1241 (1996) (explaining
a holding that a useful life statute differs from a statute of limitations because
the former is based on product age, while the latter is based on promptness of
filing a suit).
78. See Hodder, 426 N.W.2d at 832; see also Johnson, supra note 68, at 737 (imparting that Minnesota appears to be the only state that refers to the useful life
concept as a defense).
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beyond the finite period of its useful life.79 The issue in these jurisdictions is the plaintiffs behavior, not the death of the product.SO
Perhaps the time has come to reconsider this position and accept
the logical consequences of such a defensive concept. At some point,
natural deterioration, rather than a defect in design, manufacturing,
or marketing, is the cause of a plaintiffs injury.S1 Acceptance of this
premise would provide an equitable and rational limit to a manufacturer's exposure to liability.
This idea is currently in use in the areas of medicine and food products. 8 2 We have all encountered the admonitions of "best if used
before" and "sell by." Clearly, these are overt recognitions of a product's useful life. It is therefore puzzling as to why we have not extended this concept to non-perishable, more durable goods, and
perhaps even to all products.
Related to the extension of the useful life defense is the issue of its
application.8 3 The defense must be treated as a question of fact for
the jury because it is an issue wherein reasonable minds will differ.84
The useful life defense must be applied to the individual facts of each
case because some products will naturally have longer lives than
79. See Moheban, supra note 24, at 1100 (citing a Minnesota statute which allows

evidence of a product's useful life in order to show a user's contributory
80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

negligence).
See id.; see also Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 169 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. 1969)
(recognizing an inference that fault more likely lies with the user in accidents
involving older products).
See Korando v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 637 N.E.2d 1020 (Ill. 1994) (holding
that defendant was not liable for tire that had been manufactured in 1980 and
had been subjected to three punctures); Hampton v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 625
N.E.2d 192 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (affirming verdict for defendant because swingset
clamp had been put to significant use and would not last forever).
See Angela C. Rushton, Comment, Design Defects Under the Restatement (Third)
of Torts. A Reassessment of Strict Liability and the Goals of a Functional Approach, 45 EMORY L.J. 389, 434 (1996) (discussing a possible separate standard
for prescription drugs under the new Restatement).
See Gregory P. Wells, General Aviation Accident Liability Standards: Why the
Fuss?, 56 J. Am L. & Com. 895, 924 (1991) (noting that some states create a
rebuttable presumption that a product's useful life has ended when the statute of
repose expires, while other statutes of repose are specifically excluded from
application).
See Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1078, 1091 (Ind. 1993)
(Dickson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (arguing that 'the determination of whether damage is 'sudden' will necessarily depend on the unique
facts of each controversy, and will ordinarily be resolved by the trier of fact"); cf.
M. Stuart Madden, Modern Post-Sale Warnings and Related Obligations,27 Wzi.
MrrcHELL L. REv. 33, 75 (2000) (noting that the remedy of rejection must be exercised by the buyer within a reasonable period of time, and that what constitutes a
reasonable time is a question of fact).
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others.8 5 For example, a piece of heavy earth moving machinery
would, in most cases, be expected to last longer than a fragile, delicate,
or lightweight item. Identical goods of the same chronological age
could be expected to have differing durations of life because of differences in wear and tear, abuse, over-use, or exposure to the elements.8 6
To establish the useful life of a product, we can borrow from what
has long been an established principle in other areas of products liability law: the reasonable expectations theory. 8 7 This was one of the
earliest tests utilized to determine whether a product was defective.8 8
The reasonable expectations test has been used to determine defective
design, and most recently it has been applied to defective manufacture.8 9 Today, whether a product has been defectively manufactured
is determined by whether the goods in question meet the reasonable
expectations of the user or consumer. 9 0 The test is easily applied to
the useful life defense. When attempting to establish the lifespan of a
product, we can and should look to factors such as the appearance of
the product, claims made in the product's advertising, and the image
of the product that in so many cases is carefully crafted to promote
sales. As opposed to those jurisdictions considering the useful life concept in relation to contributory fault, the evidence should be considered as an affirmative defense, resulting in a bar to recovery, or at the
very least, a diminished one.
85. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 741 (opining that having triers of fact determine
the useful life of a product is preferable to giving the responsibility to
legislatures).
86. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 604.03(1) (2000) (providing that specific climate conditions should be considered when determining the useful life of a product);
Moheban, supra note 24, at 1106 (1989) (advocating a departure from considering
the individual user's habits with respect to product use).
87. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable ExpectationsApproach and the Misleading Mythology of JudicialRole, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 184-86 (1998) (discussing reasonable expectations theory in
the context of construing language in insurance policies); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions:PartI, 83 HARv. L. REV.
961, 967 (1970) (positing additional principles creating policy-holder rights beyond those terms included within the text of an insurance policy).
88. See Henderson, supra note 30, at 935-36 (discussing a consumer's reasonable expectations as a traditional justification for strict products liability).
89. See Stempel, supra note 87, at 189 (referring to the reasonable expectations doctrine as "being employed in varying situations and with varying justifications")
(quoting Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance:
Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1153
(1981)).
90. See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVER-

AGE DISPUTES § 103[b], at 22-27 (9th ed. 1998) (citing cases in which courts have
adopted the reasonable expectations doctrine); Stempel, supra note 87, at 191
(explaining that thirty-eight states have adopted some form of the reasonable
expectations doctrine).
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V. JUSTIFICATION

The useful life defense is practical as well as logical. As mentioned
previously, it is currently employed in the areas of medicine and food,
and could easily be extended in its application to all products. The
concept that all products eventually outlive their usefulness is obvious, and is now accepted in the common law of products liability litigation under the defense of deterioration. 9 1 The concept is simply an
extension of existing law.
The useful life defense tempered with the reasonable expectations
doctrine is equitable. Nothing could be fairer from the manufacturer's
perspective than a premise that limits liability to a period of time during which a product is viable, useful, and fit for its intended purpose.
Additionally, the useful life defense would ultimately save money.
In the past, section 402A has been justified on the basis that it is the
manufacturer who should bear the cost of liability.92 The manufacturer is in the best position to insure against such loss and spread the
cost of liability through the pricing of products. 9 3 Whether foreseen or
intended, section 402A and its rationale of cost distribution have resulted in higher costs to the consumer. 9 4 Limiting the manufacturer's
liability would save money for the manufacturer, which in turn would
be passed on in the form of lower prices to the public at large.9 5
Finally, from a philosophical point of view, this defense is one that
would mitigate what has previously appeared to be a steady march
towards unlimited manufacturer liability.96 Whether couched in
terms of insurance crises or the need for tort reform, the useful life
91. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
92. See Cantu, supra note 5, at 330 (justifying section 402A as a means of attributing
responsibility to a manufacturer as a cost of doing business); Van Kirk, supra
note 5, at 1695 (explaining that "manufacturers were perceived as the least cost
risk avoider since they are in the best position to detect and remedy various
hazards"); see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)
(holding that the purpose of strict liability is to ensure costs of injuries are born
by manufacturers rather than innocent plaintiffs).
93. See Lannetti, supra note 34, at 872 (describing the manufacturer's unique position of being able to "allocate the burden among all who derive benfit from its
products").
94. See Van Kirk, supra note 5, at 1724 (arguing that a useful life statute allows cost
spreading among those at risk); McGovern, supra note 26, at 590 (explaining that
manufacturers are in the best position to take measures to reduce the risk of a
defect and to pass the costs onto consumers generally).
95. See Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-BasedCompensationSystem for ProductRelated Injuries, 58 U. PiTr. L. REv. 669, 670 (1997) (explaining critic's view that
consumers pay for manufacturers' insurance coverage in the form of higher products prices); but see Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 237, 279 (1996) (imparting that the "economics of moral hazard do not support a reduction in manufacturers' liability").
96. See David J. Moffitt, The Implications of Tort Reform for GeneralAviation, AiR &
SPAcE LAw., Summer 1995, at 8 (suggesting that states have limited damages
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defense has received much attention. 97 A formal recognition of this
concept would both embrace its current application and extend it logically, practically, and beneficially.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 402A has provided a cause of action for injured plaintiffs
that is arguably inequitable to defendant manufacturers. While defendants have invoked various defenses in tempering strict liability as
provided by the Restatement, arbitrary and conflicting decisions concerning the application of those defenses have brought about the need
for a logical and equitable standard.9 8 The useful life defense is just
such a doctrine for use in allocating fault in strict product liability
cases.
While the concept of the useful life defense has received attention
and consideration in the past, this article proposes coupling it with the
reasonable expectations theory in order to form one, efficiently functioning doctrine. This combination of legal doctrines removes the
unattractive burden of uniformly determining when a given product is
legally dead. The reasonable expectations doctrine places the responsibility of determining the useful life of a product where it belongs-in
the hands of the trier of fact.
Perhaps now we can move beyond what has arguably been a manufacturer's blanket liability for a product he or she has produced. The
time has come for consumers and manufacturers alike to acknowledge, if not embrace, the idea that all products eventually lose their
usefulness and become dead as bases for liability.

after recognizing the fact that there has been virtually unlimited liability on
manufacturers).
97. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 2, at 1252 (noting that several states have outlined
statute of limitations defenses similar to the useful life defense); Christopher C.
McNatt, Jr. & Steven L. England, The Push for Statutes of Repose in General
Aviation, 23 TRANsp. L.J. 323, 337 (1995) (discussing the useful life defense in the
context of determining comparative liability in Minnesota).
98. See, e.g., Thomas V. Van Flein, Prospective Application of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability in Alaska, 17 ALAsKA L. REV. 1, 41 (2000)
(noting the conflict between the Third Restatement's position on the learned intermediary defense and an Alaska Supreme Court decision); Steven P. Zabel &
Jeffrey A. Eyres, Conflict-of-Law Issues in Multistate Product Liability ClassActions, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 429, 441-42 (1996) (noting the responses of several
jurisdictions to use of "state of the art" as an affirmative defense).

